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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE
OF FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL TO
PREVENT RECAPTURE OF ABANDONED
PATENT CLAIMS
INTRODUCTION
An inventor attempting to patent a machine, process, manu-
facture, or composition believed to be novel, useful, and unobvious
in light of prior invention1 must make written application to the
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.2 The application must
include drawings where necessary, and a specification describing
the invention with such particularity that a "person skilled in the
art" will be able to duplicate the invention.3 Additionally, the spec-
ification must describe the "best mode" of producing the invention
and conclude with claims which point out and distinctly claim the
"subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention."'4
The original application, amendments made during prosecu-
tion, and other documents submitted in defense of the application 5
by the applicant and his patent attorney or agent are stored in a
jacket known as a file wrapper. Although strict confidence is main-
tained with regard to the contents of the file wrapper during prose-
cution,6 the file is open to the public after the patent is issued.
' Three elements are critical to patentability: novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. 35
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 16 (1966).
2 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1976).
3 Id. § 112 (1976).
' Id. One commentator has equated the function of the claim to that of the real prop-
erty deed, since both describe the metes and bounds of the grant. J. LANDIS, MECHANICS OF
CLAm DRAFTING 518 (2d ed. 1974); see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01
(h)-.01(q) (4th ed. 1979 & 1980) [hereinafter cited as MPEP].
5 See note 35 infra. For an explanation of the appeal procedure see 37 C.F.R. § 1.111
(1979).
a 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1979); see MPEP, supra note 4, at §§ 101-
104.
37 C.F.R. § 1.11 (1976) provides:
(a) After a patent has been issued, the specification, drawings, and all papers
relating to the case in the file of the patent are open to inspection by the general
public, and copies may be obtained upon paying the fee therefor ....
Id. § 1.11(a); see Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1079 (1973); Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 884 n.16 (E.D. Pa.
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During infringement actions8 the court and the alleged infringer
scrutinize the contents of the file wrapper to ascertain the true
scope of the patent.' In this regard, an examination of the file
wrapper is undertaken to determine if the expansive patent inter-
pretation requested by the patentee in the infringement action had
been denied by the Patent Office during prosecution. If so, the
court may apply the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel to prevent
the assertion of claims, or their equivalents, 0 which had been sur-
rendered during prosecution of the patent."
Disagreement exists among courts concerning which papers
within the file and what types of rejections" should be considered
to determine the scope of the claimed invention and, therefore, the
issue of infringement.'3 This Note will examine the doctrine of file
1976), appeal dismissed, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1977); see MPEP, supra note 4, at § 103.
8 A person granted a patent or his assignee has "the right to exclude others from mak-
ing, using, or selling the invention thoroughout the United States" for a term of seventeen
years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976). The patent holder may enforce his right of exclusion in a civil
action for infringement. Id. § 281. In such an action the court may issue an injunction, id. §
283, award damages, id. § 284, and, where appropriate, attorney fees, id. § 285.
1 The practice of offering the contents of the file wrapper as evidence of the subject
matter claimed or abandoned is well established. See, e.g., Hubbell v. United States, 179
U.S. 77, 80 (1900); Phoenix Caster Co. v. Spiegel, 133 U.S. 360, 364-65 (1890); Shepard v.
Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 597 (1886).
"' See notes 26-29 and accompanying text infra.
1 See, e.g., Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136-37 (1942); I.T.S.
Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 443 (1926); Hubbell v. United States, 179
U.S. 77, 80, 83 (1900). Since file wrapper estoppel is only applicable where the patentee
attempts to expand his monopoly beyond a literal reading of its grant, National Research
Dev. Corp. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1108, 1120 (D. Del. 1975), it may not
be invoked to prevent a finding of infringement where the "accused matter falls clearly
within the claim," Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950).
Although the doctrine is most often invoked where the original claim is broader than
that actually granted, it is also applied where the cancelled claim is narrower than the final
claim. See, e.g., Scriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 221 (1940); Mor-
gan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425, 429 (1894); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v.
McLouth Steel Corp., 400 F.2d 36, 51-56 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1969);
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 149 U.S.P.Q. 168, 202 (E.D.N.Y.
1966), aff'd, 372 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1967). One commentator has suggested that such an appli-
cation be termed estoppel in reverse. 4 D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.0515] (1979).
1" Claims may be rejected for either prior art, MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.02, or non-
prior art reasons, id. at § 706.03. Prior art rejections are premised on anticipation or the lack
of novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976), or obviousness, id. § 103. Non-art rejections include those
premised on vagueness and indefiniteness, non-statutory subject matter, incompleteness,
prolixity, old combination, aggregation, multiplicity, new matter, obvious method, undue
breadth, and lack of utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.03.
" See, e.g., Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247,
1257-58 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 551-52 (Ct. Cl.
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wrapper estoppel as it traditionally has been interpreted by the
courts.14 Alternative judicial interpretations of the doctrine as cur-
rently advanced will be analyzed in light of recent case law, and
the trend to expansively construe the doctrine will be endorsed. 15
BACKGROUND
The seminal decision involving the application of file wrapper
estoppel was handed down by the Supreme Court nearly four de-
cades ago in Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp.16 In Exhibit
Supply, the Court had granted certiorari to determine whether the
respondent's patent for a contact switch in a pinball machine had
been infringed. To ascertain the scope of the patent holder's
claims, and thus decide the issue of infringement, the Court re-
viewed both the prior art' and the contents of the file wrapper.19
The file wrapper clearly indicated that the applicant originally had
claimed a conducting means "carried by the table," but had
amended the claims to read a means "embedded in the table"20
after the original claims were rejected as reading on the prior art.2 '
The Court concluded that the applicant had abandoned the broad
"carried by" claim and, therefore, should be estopped to construe
the narrower claim as its equivalent.2 Although the Court did not
ignore the applicant's statements concerning the scope of his in-
vention, 3 it premised the estoppel on the amendments to the
1976) (per curiam); Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp., 525 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir.
1975); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 997 (1972); Quikey Mfg. Co. v. City Prods. Corp., 409 F.2d 876, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1969);
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratran Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1974); H.M. Chase Corp. v.
Idaho Potato Processors, 96 Idaho 398, 407-10, 529 P.2d 1270, 1279-82 (1974).
It is generally held that for file wrapper estoppel to become a justiciable issue, it must
be raised at trial by the alleged infringer, but at least one court has held that it can be
raised by the court sua sponte. See General Instrument Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 399
F.2d 373, 385-86 (1st Cir. 1968).
1, See notes 30-50 and accompanying text infra.
15 See notes 51-114 and accompanying text infra.
16 315 U.S. 126 (1942).
17 Id. at 128.
18 Prior art includes all subject matter already patented or in the public domain which
would render the application unpatentable. See J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 532.
19 315 U.S. at 132-34; see note 24 and accompanying text infra.
20 315 U.S. at 133.
21 Id. at 136.
22 Id. at 137; accord, Cohn v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 53, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1977).
21 See id. at 133.
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claims,24 thus admonishing applicants that amendments would be
viewed as material disclaimers and strictly construed.2 5
In refusing to allow the patentholder to reassert claims surren-
dered by amendment, the Exhibit Supply Court precluded an ex-
pansive interpretation of the scope of the patent that is ordinarily
obtainable through employment of the doctrine of equivalents.
This doctrine permits the patentholder to assert that his patent
grants him a monopoly not only over the precise chemical, device,
or process patented, but also over equivalent chemicals, devices, or
processes.26 The purpose of the doctrine of equivalents is to pre-
vent infringement by one producing a device which "performs sub-
stantially the same function" as the plaintiff's device "in substan-
tially the same way to obtain the same result. ' 27 The doctrine thus
operates to prevent that infringement which, though not literal,
would convert a patentholder's right into a worthless and hollow
thing.28
24 Id. at 136. The Couit noted that the applicant had rejected the amendment proposed
by the examiner, preferring to cancel the offending claim and to substitute a "significantly
amended" claim which urged acceptance of the questionable claim. Id. at 133. In response,
the examiner recognized the truth of some of the applicant's suggestions, id., and thereafter,
made an additional recommendation for modification, id. at 134. The applicant acquiesced,
and the claim was allowed. Id.
25 Id. at 137. See, e.g., Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784, 790 (1931);
Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593, 598 (1886); accord, Ekco Prods. Co. v. Chicago Metallic
Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir. 1965). According to the Court, by amending his claim,
the applicant "recognized and emphasized the difference" between the two claims and "pro-
claimed his abandonment of all that is embraced in that difference." 315 U.S. at 136. See
I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 440, 444 (1926); Hubbell v. United
States, 179 U.S. 77, 80, 83 (1900).
In addition to holding the patentee estopped from reasserting claims surrendered in the
Patent Office, the Court reiterated its longstanding position that an applicant who amends
his claims acquiesces in the examiner's rejection and, therefore, is foreclosed from challeng-
ing the validity of the rejection in a subsequent infringement action. 315 U.S. at 137. The
Supreme Court has long held that appeal is the appropriate remedy for an applicant dissat-
isfied with a claim rejection. I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 443
(1926); Hubbell v. United States, 179 U.S. 77, 83 (1900); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593,
598 (1886); see note 35 infra.
. 26 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). The Graver
Tank Court advised that equivalence must be determined on a case-by-case basis, since
each ingredient must be viewed in light of the prior art, the qualities it exhibited, the pur-
poses for which it was used, and the functions it performed in the patented invention. Id. at
609. Additionally, it must appear that a person "reasonably skilled in the art" in question
would have realized the interchangeability of the patent and the alleged infringing ingredi-
ents. Id. at 609.
11 Id. at 608 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)); see
Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877).
28 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). Through
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Where the scope or validity of a patent is in issue, courts fre-
quently are faced with the difficult task of harmonizing the expan-
sive doctrine of equivalents, which protects the totality of the
patentholder's rightful monopoly, with the restrictive doctrine of
file wrapper estoppel, which insures that claims abandoned to se-
cure a patent are not reclaimed as part of the patentholder's mo-
nopoly.29 Crucial to this task is a determination of precisely what
was surrendered during prosecution and what remains as the es-
sence of the invention.30
PRESENT INTERPRETATIONS OF FILE WRAPPER ESTOPPEL
Three distinct interpretations of file wrapper estoppel-classic
file wrapper estoppel, estoppel by admission, and non-art estop-
pel-have been adopted by the courts. Some jurisdictions have ac-
cepted all three forms; others apply only one or two. Classic file
wrapper estoppel is applied by all jurisdictions where claims have
been narrowed by amendment or abandonment to overcome a
prior art rejection.3 ' Estoppel by admission is" invoked increasingly
by courts where claims have been narrowed or abandoned solely or
primarily through the clarifying remarks, arguments, and admis-
sions of the applicant or his patent attorney or agent.3 2 Finally,
application of the doctrine of equivalents the Court sought to prevent piracy by those who
introduced minor variations which added nothing to the invention, but were sufficient to
take the copied matter outside the literal words of the claim and, therefore, "outside the
reach of the law." Id. The principles of equivalency were described by Judge Learned Hand
as a doctrine, unique to patent law, which empowers the courts to stretch words and "on
proper occasions . . . make them cover more than their meaning will bear." Royal Type-
writer Co. v. Remirigton Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 825
(1948).
29 The doctrine of equivalents has been described as "'subservient to file wrapper es-
toppel.'" Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 551 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (quoting Tate
Eng'r, Inc. v. United States, 477 F.2d 1336, 1341 (Ct. Cl. 1973)).
30 As one commentator has noted, the Exhibit Supply Court did not portend the aban-
donment of equivalence by totally restricting the patentholder to a narrow, literal reading of
his amended claims. Rather, a fair and reasonable interpretation of the claims was sanc-
tioned. D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 18.02[3] (1979).
3' See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33 (1966); Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace
Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942); Koppers Co. v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co.,
517 F.2d 1182, 1185 (2d Cir. 1975); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66, 75
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Strahle v. Dillard's Dep't Stores, 459 F. Supp.
396, 398 (W.D. Tex. 1978). See MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.02. See generally note 11
supra.
32 See, e.g., Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp., 525 F.2d 182, 185-86 (7th Cir.
1975); Quikey Mfg. Co. v. City Prods. Corp., 409 F.2d 876, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1969); Jack
Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Interdent Corp. v. United
1980]
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non-art file wrapper estoppel is applied where the applicant has
narrowed or abandoned claims subsequent to a rejection for rea-
sons other than obviousness or invalidity in light of the prior art.33
Classic File Wrapper Estoppel
Classic file wrapper estoppel is premised on the theory that an
invention previously patented or in the public domain cannot be
claimed or patented by the applicant.3 4 It prevents claims that
have been amended during patent prosecution from being re-
claimed by construction or by resort to the doctrine of
equivalents.3 5 Although courts applying classic file wrapper estop-
pel place primary reliance on a showing of prior art rejection and
States, 531 F.2d 547, 551-52 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1255-58 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
11 See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406 (1st Cir.
1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966) (dicta); H.M. Chase Corp. v. Idaho Potato
Processors, 96 Idaho 398, 409, 529 P.2d 1270, 1281 (1974). See MPEP, supra note 4, at §
706.03.
3' Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 997 (1972). Summarizing the principle of classic file wrapper estoppel, the Trio
Process court held that an applicant who abandons or redrafts a claim after a prior art
rejection concedes his non-invention of that which he disclaims, and thereafter, will not be
allowed to assert that his invention lay in what was disclaimed. Id.
11 Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942); Weber Electric
Co. v. E.H. Freeman Electric Co., 256 U.S. 668, 677 (1921); Trio Process Corp. v. L. Gold-
stein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972). An applicant is
precluded from reasserting claims abandoned or surrendered during prosecution, notwith-
standing that he might have been entitled to claim more than he did and still have avoided
the prior art. Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1978). See
generally Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942). Indeed, the
court will not second-guess the examiner, but will enforce the limitation chosen by the ap-
plicant after a required amendment. Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718
(5th Cir. 1978). If an applicant wishes to preserve a rejected claim, he must protest that
rejection in the Patent Office or in the courts. I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272
U.S. 429, 443-44 (1926).
Whenever a claim is rejected, the Patent Office notifies the applicant of the reasons for
the rejection, and provides other information to assist him in determining the appropriate-
ness of continuing the solicitation. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1976); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-.127 (1979);
MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.02-.03. Additionally, an applicant may request an interview
with the examiner concerning the application. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 1.133
(1979); MPEP, supra note 4, at § 713. An applicant may appeal to the Board of Examiners,
if his claims have been rejected twice. 35 U.S.C. § 134 (1976); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.113, 1.191-.198
(1979). If an applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Appeals within the
Patent Office, he may appeal either to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 35 U.S.C.
§ 141 (1976); see 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.301-.302 (1979), or initiate an action against the Commis-
sioner in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 35 U.S.C. § 145
(1976); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.303-.304 (1979). The judicial alternatives are mutually exclusive. 35
U.S.C. § 141 (1976); 37 C.F.R. § 1.303 (1979).
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actual amendment, they also consider, as did the Exhibit Supply
Court,36 the arguments advanced on behalf of the applicant during
prosecution.17
The recent decision in Nationwide Chemical Corp. v. Wright"8
is illustrative of classic estoppel. The patentholder alleged infringe-
ment of his process patent which claimed elimination of certain
citrus diseases upon application of "four ounces per acre" of a spe-
cific hexachlorophene derivative.39 The alleged infringer was using
the same hexachlorophene derivative, in amounts only slightly in
excess of four ounces per acre, in substantially the same way, to
eliminate the diseases enumerated in the purportedly infringed
patent.4" Finding that the quantity specified in the patentee's
amended claim was selected solely to overcome longstanding prior
art rejections, the Fifth Circuit applied file wrapper estoppel to
preclude the patent holder from expanding the scope of his mo-
nopoly through the doctrine of equivalents.41 In refusing to substi-
36 315 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1942); see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
37 See, e.g., Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Minnesota, Mining & Mfg. Co., 521 F.2d
1178, 1184 (2d Cir. 1975); Welch v. General Motors Corp., 330 F. Supp 80, 83-84 (E.D. Va.
1970); Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 400 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The Second Circuit,
which had a long tradition of examining only the prior art, and the claims and amendments,
see note 51 infra, recently implied in Moore Business Forms that, although alterations in
claims were "of primary importance," distinguishing remarks made by the applicant or his
representative might affect the court's decision. 521 F.2d at 1184.
38 584 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1978).
39 Id. at 715-16.
40 Id. at 716.
41 Id. at 716-17. The Nationwide court posed a hypothetical prosecution to illustrate
the use of the doctrine of equivalents after a prior art rejection. Id. at 718. The court sug-
gested that if the patentholder had amended his claim to read two to four ounces of chemi-
cal to avoid prior art claiming four to eight ounces, and if the defendant were using one
ounce in his process, the doctrine of equivalents would allow a finding of infringement. Id.
See Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1079 (1973); Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence, 242 F.2d 347, 354 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
910 (1957). This conclusion was premised on the finding that the lower limit of the amended
claim was not required by the Patent Office to avoid a prior art rejection. 584 F.2d at.718.
The Nationwide court emphasized its belief that the Patent Office was not to be "second
guessed" as to what might have been or could have been allowed as patentable. Id. at 718.
Rather, a patentee who chose a limit after a prior art rejection was bound by his self-se-
lected limitation. Id. at 717.
A similarly strict interpretation of an amendment required to overcome prior art rejec-
tions was given in Ekco Prods. Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co., 347 F.2d 453, 455 (7th Cir.
1965). The Ekco court refused to consider how closely the allegedly infringing device ap-
proximated the patented invention, or whether the applicant might have been able to insist
on a less restrictive amendment. Id. at 454. The court suggested that once it determined
that the applicant "was forced to introduce [an] element to avoid rejection," it would hold
the patentee "strictly to the letter of the limited claims granted to him." Id. at 454-55.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tute its judgment for that of the patent examiner, the court sug-
gested that it would be improper to judicially assign to the
patentholder a monopoly that had been denied him by the Patent
Office.42
In order for classic estoppel to apply, as the Nationwide court
indicated, it is required that the claim have been amended to over-
come a prior art rejection.4 The emphasis placed on the purpose of
the amendment is illustrated by a recent district court decision in
Johnson & Johnson v. W.L. Gore & Assocs.,44 an infringement ac-
tion brought by the holder of a patent for polytetrafluoroethylene
tape with specific gravity of approximately 1.2 to 1.8.41 With re-
spect to the designated specific gravity range, the court found that
while the upper limit was specifically selected to avoid the prior
art, the lower level was not.46 Thus, since the allegedly infringing
tape had a specific gravity of .9, the court held that, had the patent
been valid, the patentee would not have been precluded by file
wrapper estoppel from resorting to the doctrine of equivalents to
expand the "literal coverage of its claims.'47
Caselaw indicates unequivocal acceptance of classic file wrap-
per estoppel to bar application of the doctrine of equivalents for
the purpose of expanding the patentee's monopoly to include those
elements abandoned during prosecution.48 Prior art cited by the
42 584 F.2d at 718. One commentator has suggested that while Nationwide was a signifi-
cant decision, the Fifth Circuit applied file wrapper estoppel in a "niggardly" manner
thereby "substantially emasculatfing] . . . the doctrine without any countervailing benefit."
PAT. L. PERSP. § B.1[1][b] (1979).
13 584 F.2d at 718. Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters & Eng'r Co., 406 F.2d 431,
438 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
" 436 F. Supp. 704 (D. Del. 1977).
4" Id. at 709. The facts and results of the Johnson & Johnson case are almost identical
to those suggested by the Nationwide court in its hypothetical patent prosecution. See note
41 supra.
" 436 F. Supp. at 709.
" Id. at 731. The Johnson & Johnson court suggested in dicta that claims cannot be
expanded under the doctrine of equivalents to cover claims originally abandoned in avoid-
ance of "a rejection based on prior art or indefiniteness." Id. at 730 (emphasis added). The
use of file wrapper estoppel after a rejection premised on indefiniteness or other non-art
reasons, see note 79 infra, is considered improper by those jurisdictions adhering strictly to
classic estoppel. See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. S & S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 517 F.2d 1182
(2d Cir. 1975); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
11 See, e.g., Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126 (1942); Hanson v.
Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 611 F.2d 156 (6th Cir. 1979); Speed Shore Corp. v. Denda, 605
F.2d 469, 472 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979); Nationwide Chem. Corp. v. Wright, 584 F.2d 714, 718 (5th
[Vol. 54:767
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examiner, the original claims, and the claims as amended after the
prior art rejection are routinely considered in determining what
was surrendered.' 9 In addition, arguments made in conjunction
with amendments to persuade the examiner of patentability over
prior art are also considered.50
ESTOPPEL BY ADMISSION
Traditionally, the patent application was regarded as a com-
pletely integrated document.5 1 As such, the parol evidence rule was
applied and, therefore, statements made by the parties during
prosecution were regarded as extrinsic to the application and
would not be considered in an infringement suit.52 An increasing
Cir. 1978); Cohn v. Coleco Indus., Inc. 558 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1977); Burger Train Sys., Inc.
v. Ballard, 552 F.2d 1377, 1384 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Christopher J.
Foster, Inc. v. Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 531 F.2d 1243, 1246 (4th Cir.
1975); Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 400 F.2d 36, 54 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1119 (1969); Taylor-Reed Corp. v. Mennen Food Prods., Inc., 324 F.2d 108,
113 (7th Cir. 1963).
4' See Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'r Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 48 (1935); Smith v.
Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784, 788-89 (1931); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber
Co., 272 U.S. 429, 436-39 (1926); Royer v. Coupe, 146 U.S. 524, 530-31 (1892). The Royer
Court held that an amended claim could not be construed as if the limitations were not in
it. Id at 532. Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals echoed this precedent, finding
that claims must be interpreted with reference to the rejected claims and not read to cover
what was eliminated by the applicant's own limiting amendments. Norwood v. Ehrenreich
Photo-Optical Indus., Inc., 529 F.2d 3, 9-10 (9th Cir. 1975).
50 See Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1942); I.T.S.
Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429, 437 (1926); Lehigh Valley R.R. v. Kearney,
158 U.S. 461, 469 (1895). The Lehigh Court restricted a claim to the exact device described
where the applicant agreed with the rejection and narrowed the claims by amendment, and
where the elements restricting the claims were mentioned specifically in reference letters.
158 U.S. at 469; accord, Haliczer v. United States, 356 F.2d 541, 544 n.1 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (per
curiam); cf. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. United States Rubber Co., 79 F.R.D. 948, 955
(6th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 679 (1936) (arguments do not create estoppel, but
often assist in understanding the differences between the original and issued claims).
91 See, e.g., Smith v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 106 F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1939); Denom-
inational Envelope Co. v. Duplex Envelope Co., 80 F.2d 186, 192-93 (4th Cir. 1935); Catalin
Corp. v. Catalazuli Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir. 1935); Barrel Fitting & Seal Corp. v.
American Flange & Mfg. Co., 74 F.2d 569, 571 (7th Cir. 1935). In Catalin Corp., Judge
Learned Hand proclaimed that "if. . . 'integration' of a written instrument has any basis at
all, . . . it should apply to ... a patent." 79 F.2d at 594. Today, even the Second Circuit,
which long held that amendments were the sole evidence of abandonment, see note 61 infra,
admits arguments made in conjunction with amendments in its application of classic file
wrapper estoppel. See, e.g., Capri Jewelry, Inc. v. Hattie Carnegie Jewelry Enterprises, Ltd.,
539 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976); Moore Business Forms, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co.,
521 F.2d 1178, 1184 (2d Cir. 1975).
52 Catalin Corp. v. Catalazuli Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir. 1935).
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number of courts, however, have acknowledged, explicitly or im-
plicitly, the appropriateness of the application of estoppel by ad-
mission in cases where an argument or other statement made on
behalf of the applicant during prosecution is the critical evidence
of narrowing or abandonment of the applicant's claims s.5  Such
statements, the courts have reasoned, are reliable indicators of the
scope of the invention because they illuminate the applicant's un-
derstanding of his discovery as well as the terms on which the ex-
aminer was willing to withdraw his prior art rejection."
Estoppel by admission is well illustrated by Quikey Manufac-
turing Co. v. City Products Corp.55 In the Quikey case, the court
denied that "periphery to periphery" slits claimed in a patent for a
squeeze-type coin purse were equivalent to foreshortened slits in
an allegedly infringing purse.56 The court reasoned that since the
applicant had convinced the examiner to withdraw his prior art
rejection by asserting that his invention was patentable over the
prior art because of the uniqueness of the periphery to periphery
slits, he should be estopped from claiming that his device was
equivalent to a purportedly infringing purse having shortened
slits. 57 Additionally, the court observed that if the patented device
53 See, e.g., Arvin Indus., Inc. v. Berns Air King Corp., 525 F.2d 182, 184, 185-86 (7th
Cir. 1975); Quikey Mfg. Co. v. City Prods. Corp., 409 F.2d 876, 878-79 (6th Cir. 1969); Doran
Coffee Roasting Co. v. Wyott Mfg. Co., 267 F.2d 200, 203 (10th Cir. 1959); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 388, 392 (D.S.C. 1974); M.O.S. Corp. v. John I. Haas,
Inc., 248 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Wash. 1965), modified on other grounds, 375 F.2d 614 (9th
Cir. 1967); Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 551-52 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per
curiam).
54 See, e.g., Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 552 (Ct. Cl. 1976) (per
curiam). The allegedly infringed device in Interdent was an electrically-powered irrigating
mechanism used primarily for dental purposes. Id. at 549. During the prosecution of the
patent, the claim at issue was rejected as reading on the prior art. Id. at 551. The applicant
argued that the prior art did not disclose his unique combination of a flexible valve and
switch mechanism. Id. The examiner withdrew his objection, and the cliim was allowed as
originally written. Id. The court determined that the claim thereafter must be construed in
light of the convincing representations of the applicant. Id. at 552. But see Colourpicture
Publishers, Inc. v. Mike Roberts Color Prod., Inc., 272 F. Supp. 280, 281 (D. Mass. 1967),
vacated on other grounds, 394 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968). The
Colourpicture court, discussing the validity of a patent, found that remarks made by patent
counsel which apparently persuaded the examiner of the patentability of the invention, did
not shed "any light on what invention was contained" in the trivial amendment despite the
semantic dexterity of the arguments. 272 F. Supp. at 281.
55 409 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1969).
50 Id. at 878-79.
57 Id. at 878. The Quikey court's examination of the file wrapper revealed that the ex-
aminer had rejected the applicant's invention based on prior art purses which had less than
"full periphery to periphery slits." Id. at 878. Subsequently, the applicant argued that
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was held to be equivalent to purses which opened by means other
than periphery to periphery slits, the patentable novelty over the
prior art would be obliterated, rendering the patent void and to-
tally unenforceable.58
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, recognizing that it
was "enunciating a rule broader than traditional 'file wrapper es-
toppel,'" recently held that estoppel by admission is properly ap-
plied where an alleged infringer demonstrates that the applicant's
remarks were the sole or critical factor in establishing the novelty
or unobviousness of his invention over the prior art.59 It is sug-
gested that such an application is proper since the arguments in
the Patent Office specifically address the distinctions between the
applicant's invention and the prior art, and ultimately convince
the examiner that the precise meaning of the claim is not within
the scope of the prior art. 0
The Second Circuit, which traditionally had rejected argu-
ments made before the Patent Office during prosecution as inad-
missible parol evidence,' recently has modified its position, and in
lengthening the slits was an important patentable improvement over the prior art cited by
the examiner. Id. The examiner agreed to reconsider the application, and thereafter allowed
the claims as originally written. Id. Affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit in Quikey
concluded that arguments made by the inventor during prosecution compelled narrow con-
struction of the patent. Id.
Id. at 879.
' Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1257-58,
(C.C.P.A. 1978). At issue in Coleco was whether the patentee was estopped from expanding
the scope of his claims by arguments in which he voluntarily cited and acknowledged a
copending application as prior art. Id. For a discussion of problems attendant to prior art
statements filed by an applicant, see WALTERSCHEID, Meeting the Duty of Candor Without
Making an Admission Against Interest, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 717 (1978). See generally In
re Nomiya, 509 F.2d 566 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re Hellsund, 474 F.2d 1307 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
The Coleco court proclaimed that having urged a narrow construction of his claims
during prosecution, a patentee is precluded from asserting an expansive reading after issu-
ance. 573 F.2d at 1257. Moreover, the court concluded that whenever a patentholder seeks
to broaden his claims through the doctrine of equivalents, his case would be open to rebut-
tal premised on any statements made on his behalf during solicitation. Id. at 1258. This
suggests that, on a case by case basis, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals will apply
estoppel to non-art rejections.
1o See id. at 1257-58.
61 See, e.g., Katz v. Horni Signal Mfg. Corp., 145 F.2d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945); Catalin Corp. v. Catalazuli Mfg. Co., 79 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir.
1935); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v. John Wanamaker, 256 F. 530 (2d Cir. 1919); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Lehman, 121 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 217 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1955); Mount
Hope Finishing Co. v. Seneca Textile Corp., 39 F. Supp. 994, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 137
F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1943). Declining to examine the attorney's arguments during prosecution,
the Spalding court declared the only purpose of the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel was to
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Capri Jewelry, Inc. v. Hattie Carnegie Jewelry Enterprises, Ltd.,62
routinely considered such statements on the issue of the applica-
bility of file wrapper estoppel.6 3 At issue in Capri Jewelry was a
claim which had been rejected as reading on the prior art. 4 The
file wrapper indicated that during prosecution, the applicant's pat-
ent attorney had interpreted the claim narrowly to avoid a prior
art rejection. 5 Invoking the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel, the
court concluded that the patentee was precluded from applying the
principles of equivalence to recapture matter which he had ac-
knowledged was the invention of another.6 " Although the applicant
had amended the claim, converting it from a dependent to an inde-
pendent claim,67 the critical distinctions between the patented de-
ascertain which claims were rejected. 256 F.2d at 533. Notably, however, the court found the
doctrine "too well settled for us to disturb" though it is "somewhat anamolous at best,"
since it entails scrutinizing the "preliminary negotiations in the interpretation of a formal
document intended to be the final memorial of the parties' intentions." Id. at 533-34.
539 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1976).
e' Id. at 851. Prior to Capri Jewelry, the Second Circuit had given some weight to
remarks made during prosecution. See Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 372 F.2d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1967); Mastini v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 369 F.2d 378,
379 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 933 (1967); Stiegele v. J. M. Moore Import-Export
Co., 312 F.2d 588, 593 (2d Cir. 1963); Eastern Elec. Inc. v. Seeburg Corp., 310 F. Supp. 1126,
1130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 427 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1970).
539 F.2d at 851.
65 Id. The prior art cited by the examiner claimed "'a laminated product wherein an
encapsulated liquid-crystal member is bonded to, and embedded between an opaque back-
ing ... and a transparent upper body member .... '" Id. The applicant's attorney had
argued that the claim "clearly specifies ... [a] transparent body ... provided with a per-
ipheral flange defining a recess within the body. Nowhere does [the prior art] disclose or
suggest such a peripheral flange or recess . . . ." Id. The allegedly infringing product at
issue in Capri Jewelry had neither a recess nor a peripheral flange. Id. at 850. The court
concluded, therefore, that since the applicant's attorney had succeeded in convincing the
Patent Office that the applicant had overcome the charge of obviousness based on the very
elements omitted from the allegedly infringing devices, file wrapper estoppel barred the ap-
plication of the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 852.
66 Id. at 852; see note 65 supra. The patent holder in Capri Jewelry also argued that
the examiner had erred when he rejected the original claims as obvious in light of the prior
art. 539 F.2d at 852. The court dismissed this argument, reminding the patent holder that
even if the examiner had been incorrect in his rejection, an applicant who "elects to acqui-
esce in it rather than pursue his other remedies" is not relieved of the bar of file wrapper
estoppel. Id. (citing International Latex Corp. v. Warner Bros. Co., 276 F.2d 557, 565 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 816 (1960)).
67 539 F.2d at 851. A dependent claim refers to and narrows a single preceding parent
claim which can itself be either dependent or independent. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976); see
MPEP, supra note 4, at § 608.01(k); J. LANDIS, supra -note 4, at 159, 521. While incorporat-
ing the parent claim by reference, a dependent claim can expand, limit, or describe elements
of its parent claim. J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 160; see 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). In contrast,
an independent claim provides a description of the subject matter without reference to
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vice and the prior art were not contained within those amend-
ments 8 but, rather, were evidenced by the arguments made before
the Patent Office.69 Consequently, the court was forced to rely
primarily on the arguments made by the applicant's representative
which convinced the examiner to withdraw his objections.7" It
appears, therefore, that the Second Circuit, while not officially
adopting estoppel by admission, has applied its principles in Capri
Jewelry by relying substantially on arguments made during
prosecution. 1
Other courts, although adopting estoppel by admission, have
applied it under varying circumstances.7 2 A district court in the
Seventh Circuit has extended the concept of estoppel by admission
to include judicial admissions made subsequent to the issuance of
the patent.73 A district court in the Ninth Circuit, while acknowl-
other claims. J. LANDIS, supra note 4, at 526. In Arvin, the plaintiff alleged that his patent
claiming a heater with a "generally planar reflective surface" was infringed by the defen-
dant's heat reflecting element. 525 F.2d at 183. The plaintiff urged an expansive interpreta-
tion of "generally planar" to include the defendant's curved device. Id. at 185. Documenta-
tion within the file wrapper demonstrated that the applicant had insisted in arguments
before the Patent Office that his "generally planar" reflector was patentable over the curvi-
linear prior art. Id. at 186. The court concluded that the defendant's device did not infringe
the plaintiff's patent since it was substantially equivalent to the prior art reflector dis-
claimed by the plaintiff's assignor in his arguments to the examiner. Id. Although the file
wrapper indicated that amendments had been made by the applicant during prosecution,
Arvin is most reflective of estoppel by admission because the court found that "the appli-
cants conduct. . .preclude[d] any resort whatsoever to the doctrine of equivalents." Id. at
185-86.
Significantly, if the Arvin court had found that the patented heating device and the
allegedly infringing one were equivalent, the court would have had to face the dilemma
described by the Quikey court, see note 58 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested
that in that event, the Arvin court would have been required to find the plaintiff's patent
indistinguishable from prior art and, therefore, invalid and unenforceable. See Quikey Mfg.
Co. v. City Prods. Corp., 409 F.2d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1969).
0' 539 F.2d at 851; see note 65 and accompanying text supra.
69 539 F.2d at 851.
70 Id.
11 See generally id.
72 See, e.g., Arvin Indus. Inc. v. Barns Air King Corp., 525 F.2d 182, 185 (7th Cir. 1975);
International Harvester Co. v. John Deere & Co., 478 F. Supp. 411, 417 (C.D. Ill. 1979); Jack
Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
13 International Harvester Co. v. John Deere & Co., 478 F. Supp. 411, 417 (C.D. Ill.
1979). The International Harvester decision was based on prior judicial admissions and not
on admissions made in the Patent Office. Therefore, it is not a true case of file wrapper
estoppel. International Harvester brought an action for declaratory judgment, alleging that
its "corn head," composed of three separate gears which drove four mobile components, did
not infringe Deere's patented "corn head," which used one gear to drive the total unit. Id. at
417. In a prior infringement action between the same litigants, Deere had maintained that
the critical element of the patent at issue in the declaratory judgment action was "the lat-
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edging that the preamble is not an element of the claim, extended
estoppel by admission principles to the preamble where it was
shown that the applicant had convinced the examiner that the pre-
amble made his invention patentable over the prior art.y
It is suggested that the judicial trend to employ estoppel by
admission aids in effectuating the equitable construction of the
scope of a patent. Clearly, if the courts do not construe the doc-
trine of file wrapper estoppel to include estoppel by admission, an
applicant who vigorously argues a narrow construction of his pat-
ent before the examiner could, in a subsequent infringement ac-
tion, successfully expand it by invoking equivalence, thereby cir-
cumventing the expertise of the Patent Office,75 and conceivably,
incorporating the prior art into his monopoly.76 The Quikey court
recognized this dilemma when it suggested that if a court were to
read the allegedly infringed patent so broadly as to be equivalent
to the prior art, then it must declare the patent invalid and totally
unenforceable. 77 Indeed, it is obvious that claims cannot be inter-
preted narrowly to determine validity and broadly to find
infringement. 8
NON-ART ESTOPPEL
Non-art estoppel is applied by some courts where an applicant
attempts to reassert a claim, or its equivalent, which had been
eral compactness ... achieved by ... a single drive gear .... Id. at 414. Additionally, in
the prior suit, Deere had distinguished its patent from prior art having multiple drive trains
by stressing the unique qualities of its single drive element. Id. The court determined that
there was no literal infringement because International Harvester's device used three sepa-
rate driving gears, id. at 415, and that Deere was estopped by its admissions in a previous
infringement suit from using equivalence to expand its monopoly. Id. at 417. A district court
in the Fourth Circuit has also applied estoppel to prior judicial admissions to prevent appli-
cation of the doctrine of equivalents. See Marston v. J.C. Penney, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 889,
894-95 (E.D. Va. 1971), afl'd per curiam, 469 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1972).
74 Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koratron Co., 375 F. Supp. 1, 20 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
71 See generally Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942).
76 See Quikey Mfg. Co. v. City Prods. Corp., 409 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1969).
7 Id. at 879; see notes 57 & 58 and accompanying text supra.
78 Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 149 U.S.P.Q. 168, 195-96
(E.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 372 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1967); see Paramount Indus., Inc. v. Solar
Prods. Corp., 186 F.2d 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1951). In Paramount Industries, the patentee
suggested a narrow reading of the prior art to insure the validity of his patent but urged the
court to read his own claims broadly. Id. Rejecting the suggested approach as inconsistent,
the court declared that the alleged infringers were correct in stating that, "'[i]f the claims
in suit are to be held not anticipated they must be given an (sic) construction under which
the defendants do not infringe.'" Id. (quoting brief of defendant).
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amended or abandoned during prosecution to avoid rejection for
reasons other than unpatentability over prior art."9 Although stat-
ing that it was inapplicable on the facts, the First Circuit endorsed
non-art estoppel in Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works,
Inc. s0
Involved in Borg-Warner was a pump for a hydraulic motor
boat transmission, which the patentee claimed was novel because
oil fluid direction could be changed merely by reversing certain
parts in the pump. 1 To obtain this result, the patentee had
designed a seal plate with two "obversely symmetrical apertures,"
each spanning 180 degrees.2 The alleged infringing pump was
identical to the patentee's except that its ports were asym-
metrical. 3
Initially determining that there was no literal infringement, 4
the court addressed the patentee's claim of equivalence. Three of
the patentholder's four original claims asserted only "functional
alignment" of the apertures; 5 the fourth provided for semicircular
19 See, e.g., Teledyne Mid-American Corp. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 449 F.2d
502, 504 (1st Cir. 1971); Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406
(1st Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966); H.M. Chase Corp. v. Idaho Potato
Processors, 96 Idaho 398, 409, 529 P.2d 1270, 1281 (1974). Non-art or formal rejections are
those premised on the form of the claim rather than on encroachment on the prior art. See
MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.03(a); LANDIS, supra note 4, at 183-206. Non-art rejections
may be based on, among other things, undue breadth, incompleteness, vagueness and indefi-
niteness, and new matter. See note 12 supra. Although the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE directs that claims be allowed if they "define ... patentable novelty with a
reasonable degree of particularity and distinctness." MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.03(d)
(emphasis in original), some latitude in the manner of expression is allowable. Id. Generally,
non-chemical claims may "be drawn as broadly as permitted by the prior art." Id. In con-
trast, the manual suggests that claims be rejected as incomplete where essential steps, ele-
ments or "necessary structural cooperative relationship of elements" are omitted. Id. at §
706.03(0.
80 355 F.2d 400, 406 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966). The First
Circuit appears to be the only federal appellate court to have specifically endorsed non-art
estoppel. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, however, has indicated its willingness
to consider the principles of file wrapper estoppel whenever the patent holder invokes the
doctrine of equivalents to expand his claims. Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1258 (C.C.P.A. 1978); see notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text
supra. It is suggested, therefore, that given the proper factual situation, that court would
apply estoppel where the patentee had surrendered his claim after a non-art rejection.
61 355 F.2d at 401.
62 Id. at 402.
83 Id. at 402-03.
I" Id. at 403.
85 Id. at 405.
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openings.8 6 After a prior art rejection, several slight amendments
were made; these were rejected and cancelled, however, as antici-
pated by the prior art, indefinite, incomplete, and functional.8 7 On
the subsequent submission of three new claims, the examiner al-
lowed the two claiming apertures "extending substantially 180'. "88
In support of his allegation of equivalence, the patentee ar-
gued that amendments to make claims more definite should never
give rise to an estoppel89 The Borg-Warner court disagreed, con-
cluding that file wrapper estoppel was applicable, since a person
examining the file wrapper to ascertain the scope of the patent,
and finding something affirmatively disclaimed, should be able to
rely on that disclaimer regardless of the reason for which it was
made.90 Indeed, since a patent is equally invalid whether the
description is inadequate, or whether it anticipates prior art, the
court reasoned that an applicant should be estopped from assert-
ing matter in any rejected claim notwithstanding the particular ob-
jection raised by the examiner.91
Increasingly, courts are beginning to recognize the applicabil-
ity of file wrapper estoppel to non-art amendments.2 Notably,
while the Third Circuit traditionally applied only classic file wrap-
86 Id.
s Id. at 405 n.8. See note 79 supra. A claim is rejected as "functional" where it either
"contains functional language not supported by recitation in the claim of sufficient structure
to warrant the presence of the functional language in the claim," or "recites only a single
means, and thus, encompasses all possible means for performing a desired function."
MPEP, supra note 4, at § 706.03(c).
355 F.2d at 405.
89 Id. at 406. The patentee urged the court not to apply file wrapper estoppel because
he had not changed the scope of his invention by altering the preamble, drawings or specifi-
cations. Id. at 405.
90 Id. at 406.
9, Id. (citing Standard Brands, Inc. v. National Grain Yeast Corp., 308 U.S. 34 (1939);
General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); H.C. Baxter & Bro. v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 236 F. Supp. 601 (D. Me. 1964), af['d, 352 F.2d 87 (lst Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 905 (1966).
92 See, e.g., Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Schmidinger v. Welsh, 383 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 946 (1968); Chemical Constr. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 311 F.2d 367
(3d Cir. 1962). The original claim of the applicant in Trio Process had been rejected as
"misdescriptive in view of the specification," and not for prior art reasons. 461 F.2d at 75. In
a subsequent infringement action, the court held that the principles of estoppel were inap-
plicable because the applicant had amended after a rejection on a "technical matter" having
no relationship to patentability. Id. The Tenth Circuit-has also refused to apply file wrapper
estoppel where the applicant has amended claims to overcome an objection based on misde-
scription. Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filters & Eng'r Corp., 406 F.2d 431, 438 (10th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969).
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per estoppel, at least two district courts within that circuit have
indicated recently that non-art rejections would provide an accept-
able basis for invoking file wrapper estoppel.9 3 The Second Circuit,
however, has not adopted the principles of non-art estoppel.9 4 Re-
cently, a district court within the Second Circuit reiterated this po-
sition, finding file wrapper estoppel inapplicable where the claims
had been rejected as indefinite or unstatutory9 5 The Fifth,98 Sev-
3 See Johnson & Johnson v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 436 F. Supp. 704 (D. Del. 1977);
Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 409 F. Supp. 511, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977). The John-
son & Johnson court stated that "[i]f a patentee narrows his claims in order to avoid a
rejection based on prior art or indefiniteness, the claims cannot later be expanded, under
the doctrine of equivalents .... ." 436 F. Supp. at 730 (emphasis added) (citing Trio Pro-
cess Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972);
Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, 355 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. dismissed,
384 U.S. 935 (1966)). Similarly, although it rejected the application of estoppel to amend-
ments which merely clarify and do not narrow the claims, the Systematic Tool court, em-
ploying language evocative of Borg-Warner, stated that where an inventor narrows his
claims to distinguish them from the prior art, or "to eliminate unpatentable claims ...
[r]egardless of the reason, the effect of such abandonment ... is to estop ... later us[e]
[of] the doctrine of equivalents." 409 F. Supp. at 514-15. Cf. Levin v. Ripple Twist Mills
Inc., 416 F. Supp. 876, 884 n.16 (E.D. Pa. 1976), appeal dismissed, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.
1977) (narrowing of claims "in response to patent office action" gives rise to estoppel). Not-
withstanding the Johnson & Johnson and Systematic Tool decisions, however, it is sug-
gested that Trio Process, from which the two district courts purported to distill the control-
ling precedent, advocated only classic estoppel. In Trio Process, the Third Circuit stated,
without further elaboration, that for file wrapper estoppel to be applicable "it is necessary,
at the least, that a claim have been narrowed to avoid the prior art. 461 F.2d at 75 (empha-
sis added). Indeed, notwithstanding Johnson & Johnson and Systematic Tool, other Third
Circuit courts continue to adhere to the traditional approach of applying estoppel only
where there has been a prior art rejection. See, e.g., International Election Sys. Corp. v.
Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd mem., 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979); Clopay
Corp. v. Blessings Corp., 422 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Del. 1976).
Although cases prior to Trio Process contain language suggesting that file wrapper es-
toppel might be applicable to amendments made other than in response to prior art rejec-
tions, no case explicitly so held. See, e.g., Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S.
126 (1942); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Essex Rubber Co., 272 U.S. 429 (1926); Shepard v. Carri-
gan, 116 U.S. 593 (1886); Bishman Mfg. Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 380 F.2d 336 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 897 (1967). Indeed, notwithstanding sweeping language sugges-
tive of a liberal interpretation of the doctrine, the Bishman case, on which express reliance
was placed in Trio Process, held file wrapper estoppel inapplicable where the claim had
been amended "simply [to] adher[e] to the most descriptive recitation of the structure." Id.
at 340.
" See, e.g., Cohn v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 558 F.2d 53, 59 (2d Cir. 1977); Koppers Co. v. S
& S Corrugated Paper Mach. Co., 517 F.2d 1182, 1185 (2d Cir. 1975).
" Schimizzi v. Chrysler Corp., 462 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). At issue in Schimizzi
was the validity and the infringement of an anti-theft device for an automobile trunk. Id. at
631. Despite finding the patent invalid because of obviousness to persons skilled in the art,
id. at 639, the court discussed the applicability of file wrapper estoppel, id. at 634. The court
advised that application of the doctrine was appropriate not only where claims which had
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enth,97 and Tenth98 Circuits have adopted similar positions, declin-
ing to apply the doctrine to restrict the interpretation of claims
where the file wrapper indicated that amendment was predicated
on non-art rejections.99
Although there appears little reason to limit the applicability
of file wrapper estoppel to claims surrendered to overcome a prior
art rejection, 100 it is not suggested that every amendment should
give rise to an estoppel. Changes which are not essential to the
scope of the invention are, it is submitted, inappropriate matter
for the application of file wrapper estoppel and, hence, should not
been rejected on prior art grounds are cancelled or narrowed, but also where elements or
limitations were added to the original claims after prior art rejection. Additionally, the court
indicated that the elements or limitations appearing in the amended claims should be
treated as "critical to patentability." Id. The court stood firm, however, in the position that
changes precipitated by indefiniteness or unstatutory rejections were inappropriate predi-
cates for the application of estoppel. See id.
9. See, e.g., Ziegler v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 483 F.2d 858, 870-71 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1079 (1973); Hunt Tool Co. v. Lawrence, 242 F.2d 347, 353-54 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 354 U.S. 910 (1957). But see Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 928,
934 (5th Cir. 1971); Strahle v. Dillard's Dep't Stores, 459 F. Supp. 396, 398 (W.D. Tex.
1978).
97 See, e.g., Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866, 876 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874 (1974); Ellipse Corp. v. Ford Motor Co., 452 F.2d 163, 168
(7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 948 (1972); Coulter Elec. Inc. v. J.T. Baker Chem. Co.,
487 F. Supp. 1172, 1175 (N.D. 11. 1980); Matherson-Selig Co. v. Carl Gorr Color Card, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 336, 350-51 (N.D. Ill. 1967). The Laser Alignment court held that notwith-
standing the assertion that the applicant surrendered something during his arduous efforts
to obtain his patent, the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel would not preclude application of
the principles of equivalence where the claims of the issued patent were "basically a re-
phrasing" of the rejected claims. 491 F.2d at 876. The court concluded that the alleged
infringer could not rely on amendments made to overcome difficulties in wording or indefi-
niteness to negate equivalents otherwise available to expand the monopoly. Id.
9" See, e.g., Burger Train Sys., Inc. v. Ballard, 552 F.2d 1377, 1384 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 860 (1977); Eimco Corp. v. Peterson Filter & Eng'r Corp., 406 F.2d 431
(10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963 (1969); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys,
Inc., 343 F.2d 381, 403 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966).
" The position of the Ninth Circuit regarding non-art estoppel is unclear. In Speed
Shore Corp. v. Denda, 605 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1979), the court of appeals affirmed, as not
clearly erroneous, the district court's refusal to apply file wrapper estoppel where amend-
ments were made only to clarify claims, id. at 472 n.6. The court did not, however, address
the application of the doctrine to other non-art rejections. See Norwood v. Ehrenreich
Photo-Optical Indus., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 898, 904 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 529 F.2d 3, 9 (9th
Cir. 1975). In Norwood, the district court specified that "[n]o limitation which a patentee
puts into his claim may be ignored, whether or not the limitation was necessary to validate
the claim." Id. at 904.
100 Coleco Indus., Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 573 F.2d 1247, 1257-58; see
note 59 supra.
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preclude application of the doctrine of equivalents. 10 1 In contrast,
where changes in terms essential to the invention's scope are man-
dated by vagueness, or necessitated by overclaiming, application of
file wrapper estoppel would seem appropriate. 102 This is especially
true because an applicant disagreeing with the examiner's rejection
has remedies within the Patent Office and the courts during the
prosecution period; he need not amend his claims without pro-
test.1 03 Indeed, if an applicant agrees to a narrow construction of
an essential term to overcome a non-art rejection, equitable appli-
cation of the doctrine of file wrapper estoppel demands that he be
precluded from circumventing the patent procedure by resur-
recting the exact matter denied him by the Patent Office.104
The decision in H.M. Chase Corp. v. Idaho Potato Processors,
Inc., °5 illustrates that courts do not look kindly on attempts to
revive claims surrendered to satisfy the examiner. In Chase, the
court was asked to uphold the contractual rights of a patent holder
who maintained that his steam blanching potato process was
equivalent to the hot water blanching process used by his licen-
see.108 The file wrapper showed that during prosecution the appli-
cant had attempted to amend his original claim of a steam process
to include hot water, but had received a non-art rejection.' 07 After
several subsequent amendments were likewise rejected for non-art
reasons,'08 the applicant retreated without protest and reclaimed
his original steam blanching process. 09 In light of the unsuccessful
attempts at amendment, the Chase court determined that the ap-
"', See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). See
generally notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
10' See Borg-Warner Corp. v. Paragon Gear Works, Inc., 355 F.2d 400, 406 (1st Cir.
1965), cert. dismissed, 384 U.S. 935 (1966); H.M. Chase Corp., v. Idaho Potato Processors
Inc., 96 Idaho 398, 409, 529 P.2d 1270, 1281 (1974).
103 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 131-135, 141-146 (1976); note 87 supra.
104 Cf. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942) (patentee may
not reclaim that which he surrendered by acquiescing in strict construction of his claim).
But see Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, 461 F.2d 66, 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 997 (1972) (formalistic rules of Patent Office should not deprive patentee of full mea-
sure of his invention).
105 96 Idaho 398, 529 P.2d 1270 (1974).
'0' Id. at 406, 529 P.2d at 1278.
107 Id. at 407, 529 P.2d at 1279. The examiner based the rejection on the introduction of
new material. Id. A new matter rejection is derived from the last sentence of 35 U.S.C. § 132
(1976) which prohibits such additions to the patent claims. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1976); 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.118 (1979); see MPEP, supra note 4, §§ 608.04-.04(c), 706.03(o).
"1 96 Idaho at 407, 529 P.2d at 1279.
109 Id.
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plicant knew that the examiner viewed hot water and steam
blanching as non-equivalent, and that the applicant had acqui-
esced in the examiner's finding in order to assure issuance of his
patent.110 The Chase court thus applied non-art estoppel to pre-
vent the patentee from expanding his monopoly to include those
very matters abandoned or denied during prosecution."'
A determination of immateriality with respect to a non-art
amendment should not be equated, however, with a finding of ir-
relevancy. Although admittedly, the only changes mandated by
non-art rejections which are proper subject matter for estoppel are
those which affect the scope of the invention," 2 it is suggested that
all amendments made subsequent to non-art rejections have a
valid place before the court. Indeed, while amendments which are
based on a non-art rejection of matter not essential to the inven-
tion's scope should not prevent use of the principles of equiv-
alency, 113 it is submitted that general evidentiary principles dictate
that altered claims nevertheless should be admitted in infringe-
ment actions as some evidence of the true scope of the invention.
1 4
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of file wrapper estoppel was developed to coun-
terbalance the broad construction of patents obtainable through
the employment of principles of equivalency. In its classical form,
the doctrine has been uniformly accepted and applied to prevent
the recapture of claims surrendered or abandoned by amendment
to overcome prior art rejection. Recently, however, courts have be-
gun to expand the scope of the doctrine by eliminating the require-
ment that a claim be relinquished by amendment. Indeed, an in-
creasing number of courts currently hold that file wrapper estoppel
is applicable to admissions made by or on behalf of the patentee
which concern the parameters of his invention. A few courts, more-
11o Id. at 409-10, 529 P.2d at 1281-82.
Id. at 410, 529 P.2d at 1282.
112 See Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 409 F. Supp. 511, 514-15
(E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857
(1977); H.M. Chase Corp. v. Idaho Potato Processors, Inc., 96 Idaho 398, 409, 529 P.2d 1270,
1281 (1974).
11 See notes 26-29 and accompanying text supra.
114 It is suggested that changes agreed to by the applicant be examined under the ordi-
nary rules of evidence to ascertain whether an admission has been made. See McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 262, 267 (2d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1978); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1048-1059 (3d
ed. 1940 & 1970 Supp.).
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over, while not necessarily dispensing with the requirement of
amendment, have further expanded classic file wrapper estoppel
by employing the doctrine to preclude reassertion of any essential
claim previously relinquished. As this Note has attempted to
demonstrate, such expansions are consonant with the theory and
purpose of file wrapper estoppel. Indeed, it is fundamental that a
patentholder should be precluded from circumventing the exper-
tise of the examiner by attempting to expand the scope of his mo-
nopoly beyond that which was granted. Estoppel by admission and
non-art estoppel, although not uniformly credited, recognize the
utility of certain representations made by an applicant to deter-
mine his conception of the invention. It is urged, therefore, that
courts scrutinize admissions made by or on behalf of an applicant
as well as essential non-art amendments in order to more equitably
ascertain the true scope of a patent.
Carole F. Barrett
